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Abstract
A fundamental problem in the theory of secure multi-party computation (MPC) is to character-
ize functions with more than 2 parties which admit MPC protocols with information-theoretic
security against passive corruption. This question has seen little progress since the work of Chor
and Ishai (2001), which demonstrated difficulties in resolving it. In this work, we make signific-
ant progress towards resolving this question in the important case of aggregating functionalities,
in which m parties P1, . . . , Pm hold inputs x1, . . . , xm and an aggregating party P0 must learn
f(x1, . . . , xm).
We give a necessary condition and a slightly stronger sufficient condition for f to admit a
secure protocol. Both the conditions are stated in terms of an algebraic structure we introduce
called Commuting Permutations Systems (CPS), which may be of independent combinatorial
interest.
When our sufficiency condition is met, we obtain a perfectly secure protocol with minimal
interaction, that fits the model of Non-Interactive MPC or NIMPC (Beimel et al., 2014), but
without the need for a trusted party to generate correlated randomness. We define Unassisted
Non-Interactive MPC (UNIMPC) to capture this variant. We also present an NIMPC protocol
for all functionalities, which is simpler and more efficient than the one given in the prior work.
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A fundamental problem in the theory of secure multi-party computation (MPC) is to
characterize functions with more than 2 parties which admit MPC protocols with information-
theoretic security against passive corruption. This question has seen little progress since the
work of Chor and Ishai [2], which demonstrated difficulties in resolving it.
We report an ongoing work, in which we make significant progress towards resolving this
question in the important case of aggregating functionalities: In an aggregating functionality,
there arem parties P1, . . . , Pm with inputs x1, . . . , xm and an aggregating party P0 must learn
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class. In particular, it has been the subject of an influential line of study that started with the
minimal model for secure computation of Feige, Kilian and Naor [4]. This model – sometimes
refered to as the Private Simultaneous Messages (PSM) model – served as a precursor of
important concepts like randomized encodings [5] that have proven useful in a variety of
cryptographic applications. Recently, a strengthening of this model, called Non-Interactive
MPC (NIMPC) was introduced by Beimel et al. [1], which is closer to standard MPC in
terms of the security requirements. In both these models the severe restriction on the
communication pattern often leads to simple and elegant protocols. Indeed, for specialized
functions (like “Remote-OT” and AND) the original protocols developed in the PSM model
[4] can also be shown to be optimal (or very nearly so) in terms of communication and
randomness complexity [3, 9]. Similarly, Beimel et al. discovered several elegant NIMPC
protocols for special classes of functions [1]. However, these protocols do not directly translate
to MPC protocols as these models include a trusted party which sends correlated random
variables to the parties in a pre-processing phase. The term aggregating functionality was
coined in [8].
Our contributions in this work fall into three broad categories: (1) minimal models
of computation, (2) algebraic-combinatorial classes of aggregating functionalities, and (3)
positive and negative results relating the above two.
Minimal Models of MPC. The previous minimalistic models of MPC – PSM [4] and
NIMPC [1] – admit secure protocols for all functions, unlike the full-fledged MPC model.
Our minimalistic models (called UNIMPC∗ and UNIMPC) admit secure protocols only for
functions which have secure protocols in the MPC model. While the previous models were
proposed in the context of studying communication complexity of information-theoretic MPC,
ours is perhaps the first significant model aimed at studying the feasibility of information-
theoretic MPC.
UNIMPC stands for Unassisted NIMPC and, as the name suggests, removes the assistance
from the trusted party in NIMPC: Instead the parties should securely compute the correlated
randomness by themselves, in an offline phase. Unlike PSM and NIMPC, which allow trusted
parties, UNIMPC retains the standard security model of MPC, allowing corruption of any
set of parties. While MPC and NIMPC are incomparable in the sense that an MPC protocol
does not yield an NIMPC protocol (because of the general communication pattern) and an
NIMPC protocol does not yield an MPC protocol (because of the use of a trusted party),
UNIMPC could be seen as a common denominator of these two secure computation models.
A UNIMPC protocol can be directly interpreted as an MPC protocol as well as an
NIMPC protocol.
UNIMPC∗ corresponds to a minimalistic version of UNIMPC, with protocols which have
a single round of (simultaneous) communication among the parties before they get their
inputs, followed by a single message from each party to the aggregator after they receive their
input. (UNIMPC allows arbitrarily many rounds of communication prior to receiving inputs.)
Understanding the gap between the classes of functionalities with UNIMPC and UNIMPC∗
protocols is closely related to understanding the power of multiparty secure sampling [7].
Commuting Permutations Systems. We identify an algebraic-combinatorial structure
called Commuting Permutations System (CPS) and a sub-class called Commuting Permuta-
tion Subgroup Systems (CPSS).
Below Sn denotes the symmetric group – the group of all permutations of n elements.
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I Definition 1. An (n,m)-Commuting Permutations System (CPS) is a collection (X1, · · · ,
Xm) where for all i ∈ [m], Xi ⊆ Sn contains the identity permutation, and for any collection
(π1, · · · .πm) with πi ∈ Xi, and ρ ∈ Sm, π1 ◦ · · · ◦ πm(1) = πρ(1) ◦ · · · ◦ πρ(m)(1).1
It is called an (n,m)-Commuting Permutation Subgroups System (CPSS) if each Xi is a
subgroup of Sn.
An (m+ 1)-party aggregating functionality f : X1 × · · · ×Xm → [n] is said to be a CPS
functionality (resp. CPSS functionality) if (X1, · · · , Xm) is an (n,m)-CPS (resp. (n,m)-CPSS)
and for all (π1, · · · , πm) ∈ X1 × · · · ×Xm, f(π1, · · · , πm) = (
∏
i∈[m] πi)(1).
Results. Our main results can be summarized as follows. Writing CPS (or CPSS) for
class of functionalities that “embed” into a CPS (respectively, CPSS) functionality, and
UNIMPC∗, UNIMPC and MPC for classes of functionalities that admit the corresponding
secure protocol, we have, for any number of parties,
CPSS ⇒ UNIMPC∗ ⇒ UNIMPC ⇒ MPC ⇒ CPS.
Note that we leave an intriguing gap between the necessary and sufficient conditions.
In particular we leave open the possibility that the set of functionalities with UNIMPC
protocols is a strict subset of the set of aggregating functionalities with MPC protocols, and
is a strict superset of aggregating functionalities with UNIMPC∗ protocols. However, these
differences disappear for small number of parties: When the number of input parties is 2, we
show that UNIMPC∗ ⇔ CPS, and when the number of input parties is 3, UNIMPC ⇔ CPS.
We also obtain a characterization of all “Latin hypercube functionalities” which have an
MPC protocol, and show that they all have UNIMPC∗ protocol. This result relies on the above
results, as well as on the existence of NIMPC protocols for every CPS functionality. For the
sake of being self-contained we present a simple NIMPC protocol for general functionalities,
which in fact turns out to be more efficient than the prior constructions [1, 6].
Our results could be seen as a step towards fully characterizing the functionalities
with information-theoretic MPC protocols in various security models. For instance, for
characterizing functionalities with UC secure protocols, aggregating functionalities remain
the only class to be understood [8], and the sub-classes of aggregating functionalities identified
in this work can serve as a starting point for understanding UC security. Similarly, the
problem of characterizing symmetric functions (when all parties get the same output) as
considered in [2] is still unsolved, but our positive results do present new possibilities there
(because a passive-secure MPC protocol for an aggregating functionality can be readily
converted into one for a symmetric functionality computing the same function).
References
1 Amos Beimel, Ariel Gabizon, Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Sigurd Meldgaard, and Anat
Paskin-Cherniavsky. Non-interactive secure multiparty computation. In Juan A. Garay
and Rosario Gennaro, editors, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2014 - 34th Annual
Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 17-21, 2014, Proceedings, Part
II, volume 8617 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 387–404. Springer, 2014.
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44381-1_22.
2 Benny Chor and Yuval Ishai. On privacy and partition arguments. Information and
Computation, 167(1):2–9, 2001.
1 Choice of 1 is arbitrary. Requiring identity permutation to always be part of each Xi is w.l.o.g., as a
CPS without it will remain a CPS on adding it.
ICALP 2018
103:4 MPC, Commuting Permutation Hypercubes and UNIMPC
3 Deepesh Data, Manoj Prabhakaran, and Vinod Prabhakaran. On the communication
complexity of secure computation. CoRR Report 1311.7584 available from http://arxiv.
org, 2013.
4 Uriel Feige, Joe Kilian, and Moni Naor. A minimal model for secure computation (extended
abstract). In STOC, pages 554–563. ACM, 1994. doi:10.1145/195058.195408.
5 Yuval Ishai and Eyal Kushilevitz. Randomizing polynomials: A new representation with
applications to round-efficient secure computation. In FOCS, pages 294–304, 2000.
6 Satoshi Obana and Maki Yoshida. An efficient construction of non-interactive secure mul-
tiparty computation. In Cryptology and Network Security - 15th International Conference,
CANS 2016, Milan, Italy, November 14-16, 2016, Proceedings, pages 604–614, 2016.
7 Manoj Prabhakaran and Vinod Prabhakaran. On secure multiparty sampling for more than
two parties. In Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE International Information Theory Workshop
(ITW 2012), 2012.
8 Manoj Prabhakaran and Mike Rosulek. Cryptographic complexity of multi-party com-
putation problems: Classifications and separations. In David Wagner, editor, Advances
in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2008, 28th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa
Barbara, CA, USA, August 17-21, 2008. Proceedings, volume 5157 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 262–279. Springer, 2008. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85174-5_15.
9 Sundara Rajan S, S. Rajakrishnan, A. Thangaraj, and V. Prabhakaran. Lower bounds
and optimal protocols for three-party secure computation. In 2016 IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pages 1361–1365, July 2016.
